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A B S T R A C T   
 
 
 
This paper presents a new methodology for the creation and management of coalitions in Electricity Markets. This approach is tested using the 
multi-agent market simulator MASCEM, taking advantage of its ability to provide the means to model and simulate VPP (Virtual Power Producers). 
VPPs are repre- sented as coalitions of agents, with the capability of negotiating both in the market, and internally, with their members, in order to 
combine and manage their individual specific characteristics and goals, with the strategy and objectives of the VPP itself. 
The new features include the development of particular individual facilitators to manage the communications amongst the members of each coalition 
independently from the rest of the simulation, and also the mechanisms for the classification of the agents that are candidates to join the coalition. 
In addition, a global study on the results of the Iberian Electricity Market is performed, to compare and analyze different approaches for defining 
consistent and adequate strategies to integrate into the agents of MASCEM. This, combined with the application of learning and prediction 
techniques provide the agents with the ability to learn and adapt themselves, by adjusting their actions to the continued evolving states of the world 
they are playing  in. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The recent restructuring of the energy markets, characterized by 
an enormous increase of the competition in this sector, led to 
relevant changes in the participating entities operation [1,2], which 
brought along some new problems and issues to be  addressed. 
Some of the most important difficulties arise from the fact that the 
coordination between technical and economic issues is much more 
complex in the present context. Electricity market operation has to 
consider the physical constraints of power systems, market oper- 
ation rules and financial issues. 
Technical requirements of power systems are not always 
adequately addressed by electricity markets’ rules. This is mainly 
due to two main factors: little experience in competitive electricity 
markets operation and the complexity of modelling relationships 
between power systems and electricity markets operation. This 
requires not only robust economic and financial  background but 
also power system physics background. A clear understanding of 
the impact of power systems physics on market dynamics and vice- 
versa is also required. 
 
 
Real-world restructured electricity markets are sequential 
open-ended games with multiple participants trading for electric 
power on a daily basis. Market players and regulators are very 
interested in foreseeing market behaviour: regulators to test rules 
before they are implemented and detect market inefficiencies; 
market players to understand market behaviour and operate in 
order to maximize profits. 
Each player acting in an Electricity Market has his own goals and 
should use adequate strategies in order to pursuit those goals, its 
strategic behaviour [3] being determinant for its success. A player’s 
behaviour exhibits changes in response to new information and 
knowledge that he may have; this may refer to his self knowledge, 
to knowledge coming from the exterior and from the dynamic 
complex interactions of the heterogeneous individual entities. 
In general, competitive environments, as is the present case of 
electricity markets, require good decision-support tools to assist 
players in their decisions. Relevant research is being undertaken in 
this field, namely in what concerns player modelling and simula- 
tion, strategic bidding and decision-support [4e8]. 
The problem is that, in the case of complex markets, the internal 
dynamics, due namely to players’ strategic behaviour and interac- 
tion with each other, has to be considered. This is why AI (artificial 
intelligence) approaches, namely multi-agent systems, may give an 
important  contribution  for  market  modelling  and simulation. 
 
  
Moreover, AI is also extremely important for providing market 
players with decision-support tools [9e11]. 
To explore and study different approaches in dealing with these 
issues, several modelling tools directed to the study of restructured 
wholesale power markets have emerged [12]. Some relevant tools 
in this domain are the “AMES Wholesale Power Market Test Bed” 
[6,7] and “EMCAS e Electricity Market Complex Adaptive System” 
[13]. MASCEM e Multi-Agent Simulator for Electricity Markets 
[3,4,14] is also a modelling tool that is being used to study 
restructured electricity markets. 
MASCEM considers agents, representing the different indepen- 
dent entities in Electricity Markets, allowing them to establish their 
own objectives and decision rules. They have dynamic strategies 
that consider other agents’ behaviour, learning from past situations 
and agents’ past actions. 
This paper focuses on the MASCEM agents’ ability to adapt and 
act accordingly to the constantly evolving stages of the “world” in 
which they are meant to act on. So having in mind the present fierce 
competitive electricity markets, each day players need to find 
different and better ways to face market dynamics and pursuit their 
goals. In a scenario like the electricity markets players should 
predict what is to come to be better prepared for dealing with the 
changes. Considering that, different approaches in dealing with the 
markets must be tried, in order to obtain a better understanding of 
how to get the best results when negotiating in the market, being 
able to define adequate strategic behaviour [15e17]. Analysis and 
simulation studies are important to understand in what ways one 
and others’ behaviour can affect the negotiations. This allows to 
focus on the negotiation strategies, and to understand  how 
different ways of playing in the market can get us better results in 
different situations [3,4,18]. 
The paper presents several studies on the Iberian Electricity 
Market, where some predicting strategies are applied, in order to 
compare different approaches and decide on the best ways to 
improve the agents’ capabilities to adapt and constantly adequate 
and refine  their strategies [15e17]. 
The paper also addresses the inclusion of VPP (Virtual Power 
Players) models and simulation tools in the scope of MASCEM. VPPs 
represent the aggregation of a set of producers, mainly based on DG 
(distributed generation) and renewable sources. They can provide 
the means to adequately support the increasing use of DG and its 
participation in the context of competitive electricity    markets. 
VPPs are responsible for the management of the coalition of 
producers, including the role of negotiating in the energy market in 
behalf of the coalition, and negotiating internally with their 
members, to guarantee that the terms of each member’s contracts 
are fair and suited to the VPPs characteristics and objectives. For 
that we also present a classification algorithm, which analyses each 
producer’s characteristics and tests their suitability to the VPPs 
objectives. This process provides the VPP with the knowledge of 
which producers are most likely to favourably contribute to the 
VPPs’ achievement of better results, and so allowing the VPP to 
decide which  producers  to aggregate or  not in  each moment. 
This classification mechanism provides another great advan- 
tage; it allows the VPP to distribute the profits amongst its 
members with a fair basis, having in account the classification value 
that each member was awarded, in addition to the amounts of 
energy that it  produced. 
Section 2 presents an overview of MASCEM simulator, including 
the simulator’s multi-agent model, and the implemented negotia- 
tion mechanisms. Section 3 deals with coalitions, in the context of 
multi-agent systems, detailing its use for VPP modelling in MAS- 
CEM, and describes the producers’ classification mechanism. 
Section 4 presents a case study with several examples, where the 
new strategy proposals are analyzed, and finally Section 5  presents 
the most relevant conclusions of the paper, and the future devel- 
opments to be implemented in the MASCEM simulator. 
 
2. MASCEM simulator 
 
MASCEM is a modelling and simulation tool that has been 
developed with the purpose of studying complex restructured 
electricity markets operation. It provides market players with 
simulation and decision-support resources, being able to give them 
a competitive advantage in the market. 
As market players are complex entities, having their very own 
characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and inter- 
acting with other players, MASCEM was developed as a multi-agent 
based simulation tool, modelling the complex dynamic market 
players, including their interactions and medium/long-term gath- 
ering of data and experience. MASCEM uses game theory, machine 
learning techniques, scenario analysis and optimization techniques 
to model market agents and to provide them with decision-support 
[3,19,20]. 
MASCEM’s purpose is to be able to simulate as many market 
models and player types as possible so it can realistically reproduce 
the operation of real electricity markets. This enables it to be used 
not only as a simulation and decision-support tool for short/ 
medium term purposes, but also as a tool to support long-term 
decisions, such as the ones taken by regulators. 
MASCEM includes several negotiation mechanisms usually 
found in electricity markets. MASCEM can simulate several types of 
markets, namely: Pool Markets, Bilateral Contracts, Balancing 
Markets and Forward Markets. 
Forward contracts, which are a significant part of electricity 
trading, play a crucial role in the electricity market. These are 
contracts that fix prices now for electricity that will be supplied 
later, and enable speculation on future price development or 
hedging. 
Power exchanges established the trade of forward and futures 
contracts early on and, by now, large volumes are being traded. A 
power forward contract is characterized by a fixed delivery price 
per MW, a delivery period and the total amount of energy to be 
delivered. One can observe that contracts with a long delivery 
period show less volatile prices than those with short delivery 
periods. 
VPP Forward Market operation will be limited by the aggregated 
producers. If the VPP has many producers whose generation 
depends on natural resources, it is complicated to establish forward 
contracts because the guarantee of the energy supply is    low. 
In day-ahead electricity markets, electricity is traded for each 
hour, or mid-hour of the next day. The energy price in balancing 
markets can obviously be different from the day-ahead  market 
price enabling the VPP to incur in losses or   profits. 
 
2.1. MASCEM multi-agent model 
 
There are several entities involved in the negotiations in the 
scope of electricity markets; our multi-agent model represents all 
the involved entities and their relationships. MASCEM’s multi- 
agent model includes: a Market Facilitator Agent, Seller Agents, 
Buyer Agents, VPP (Virtual Power Producer) Agents, VPP Facilitator 
Agents, a Market Operator Agent and a System Operator Agent. 
Fig. 1 presents the MASCEM global structure, with the repre- 
sentation of its most important entities and   interactions. 
In the simulation, the Market Facilitator acts as the coordinator 
of the market but it must be seen as a computational entity that 
does not represent a real entity playing in the market. It knows the 
identities of all the agents present in the market, regulates the 
negotiation  process   and   assures  the   market   is  functioning 
  
 
 
Fig. 1.  MASCEM negotiation framework. 
 
according to the established rules. The first step agents have to take 
to participate in the market is to register at the Market Facilitator, 
specifying their market role and  services. 
The System Operator Agent represents the entity that is 
responsible for the transmission grid and all the involved technical 
constraints. Every established contract, either through Bilateral 
Contracts or through the Pool, must be communicated to the 
System Operator, who analyses its technical feasibility from the 
Power System point of  view. 
The Market Operator Agent is responsible for the negotiation in 
the scope of a pool and by the resulting market clearing. This agent 
is only present in simulations of Pool or Hybrid markets. The 
Market Operator will receive bids from Sellers and Buyers, analyze 
them and determine the MCP (market clearing price) and accepted 
bids. 
Seller and Buyer Agents are the two key players in the market. 
Sellers represent entities able to sell electricity in the market, e.g. 
companies holding electricity production units. Buyers may 
represent electricity consumers or even distribution  companies. 
The user, who must also specify his intrinsic and strategic charac- 
teristics, defines the number of Sellers and Buyers in each scenario. 
Sellers will compete with each other, since each seller is inter- 
ested in maximizing its profits. On the other hand, Sellers will 
cooperate with Buyers while trying to establish some agreement 
that is profitable for both. From this point of view, electricity 
markets are a very rich domain where it is possible to develop and 
test several algorithms and negotiation mechanisms for both 
cooperation   and   competition,   coexisting   in   the   same complex 
environment. 
VPPs are special entities; they represent coalitions of producers 
that for some reason do not have the power or desire to negotiate in 
the market by themselves. This can be due to their small dimension 
and low production, or for strategic reasons. VPPs negotiate in the 
market by representing their aggregated members, and are seen by 
the market as regular sellers. 
VPPs have the features of negotiating both in the market, and 
also internally, inside the coalition, with its members, in order to 
adequate the used strategies to their objectives and characteristics. 
The VPP Facilitators support VPPs’ business. They gather infor- 
mation about generation agents, both those who are playing in the 
market and those who are not. This information is relevant for VPP 
business because some producers of reduced dimension cannot 
participate separately in the market, but can be associated to a VPP. 
The VPP Facilitators manage the information between the 
producers that are part of the coalition and the VPP in the VPP 
aggregation process and in its operation process. The VPP Facilita- 
tors inform the Market Facilitator about new agreements   between 
producers and VPPs. 
VPPs’ integration in MASCEM and the developments that this 
inclusion implies are detailed in Section  3. 
 
2.2. MASCEM negotiation mechanisms 
 
On the basis of the results obtained in the past periods, Sellers 
and Buyers revise their strategies for the future. Seller and Buyer 
Agents have strategic behaviour to define their desired price. These 
agents have time-dependent strategies, and behaviour-dependent 
strategies, to define the price for the next day according to the 
results previously obtained. 
To adjust price between days, also referred as behaviour- 
dependent strategies, MASCEM provides two basic strategies: one 
called Composed Goal Directed and another called Adapted 
Derivative Following. These are important strategies that use the 
knowledge obtained with past experiences to define bid prices for 
next periods. 
The Composed Goal Directed strategy is based on two consec- 
utive objectives, according to each player objectives. 
The Adapted Derivative Following strategy is based on a Deriv- 
ative Following strategy proposed by Greenwald [21]. The Adapted 
Derivative  Following  strategy adjusts  its  price  by looking  to  the 
  
amount of revenue earned in previous periods as a result of the 
previous price change. 
According to each player model and knowledge, these strategies 
are composed with more specific strategies, giving place to 
specially tailored strategies for each agent. As an example, in the 
case of producers, the specific strategies take into account the 
generation technology. In the case of generation technologies based 
on renewable sources, highly dependent from weather factors, 
these are considered. For each player, all relevant strategies are 
composed, according to the player defined goals and to the iden- 
tified situation. In this way, player strategic behaviour depends 
from several aspects, namely the following: 
 
• player defined goals; 
• player model (including technical characteristics); 
• player knowledge (namely concerning other players’ models); 
• context (taking into account factors of different nature, 
including market regulation, external factors such as oil prices, 
weather, which are considered in the player model but also in 
a more general context, namely for load forecasting). 
 
This approach makes players’ strategies adaptive both to each 
player and to each situation. 
One of our main goals is to provide MASCEM with the means to 
adapt itself to the surrounding  constantly changing environment. 
At each moment MASCEM analyses the conditions of the world and 
the actions that should be more suitable in that context. To 
accomplish this goal, MASCEM analyses the world it is simulating 
(the electricity market), trying to understand how it is evolving at 
each moment, as well as the players that are operating in   it. 
One of the most important issues in adapting players’ behaviour 
is providing them the means to correctly perceive which are the 
most advantageous decisions for them to perform, taking into 
account the characteristics of the players they interact with. This is 
our goal in defining coalition formation mechanisms according to 
players’ data. Our proposal to do so is presented in the following 
section. 
 
3. Coalitions management 
 
3.1. VPPs integration in MASCEM 
 
VPPs (Virtual Power Players) are multi-technology and multi- 
site heterogeneous entities. Relationships among aggregated 
producers, VPPs and the remaining Electricity Market agents   are 
a key factor for their success  [22]. 
To sell energy in the market, VPPs must forecast the generation 
of the aggregated producers and “save” some power capacity to 
assure a reserve to compensate a generation oscillation of 
producers with technologies dependent on natural resources. 
From the point of view of the multi-agent system, VPPs are seen 
as coalitions of agents, requiring specific procedures for coalition 
formation. Once a coalition is established, it can aggregate more 
agents or even discard some, depending on the established 
contracts. This model allows modelling the entire decision making 
concerning VPP formation and also subsequence aggregation of 
more producers. 
To take decisions about these issues, VPPs have to detain 
knowledge related with the existing producers, which can even- 
tually be aggregated. Decisions concerning VPP formation and 
aggregation of new producers result mainly from two distinct 
matters. On one hand, each VPP classifies the producers according 
to a set of criteria defined by itself. On the other hand, it establishes 
the goals of VPP formation or of aggregation of more producers, 
according to its operating strategies and to its necessities at the 
moment. Aggregation proposals are then elaborated in function of 
the  resulting knowledge. 
Once the VPP formation process is finished, the VPP needs to 
coordinate its operation. The VPP must place bids in the market, 
considering the contracts with its producers, the generation fore- 
cast, the reserves and its market strategy. However, as VPPs are 
themselves a set of other agents, there are some preliminary steps 
to define their  bids. 
Firstly, all the capacity available from the different aggregated 
distributed energy resources must be gathered to establish the 
electricity amount to trade on the market. The different generation 
costs must be analyzed to define the interval for envisaged 
proposals. This means VPP agents will have an utility function that 
aggregates all the involved units’ characteristics. The analysis of the 
aggregated producers’ proposals will be done according to each 
unit’s capabilities and costs. 
After the market session, the VPP agent undertakes an internal 
dispatch, analyzing and adjusting its generation and reserve to 
maximize profits and informs the aggregated producers about their 
dispatch. 
Finally, in function of the generation, the used and unused 
reserve of each producer and the established contracts of the VPP 
fulfilment, the VPP determines the producers’ remuneration   [23]. 
The Introduction of VPP models in MASCEM required to re-think 
MASCEM architecture, namely in what concerns agent communi- 
cation [14]. 
From a conceptual point of view, each VPP can be seen as an 
agent coalition (Fig. 2). 
In Fig. 2 we can see, highlighted, the changes to the initial 
MASCEM structure, considering the integration of VPPs as new 
multi-agent systems with their own facilitators, inside the global 
architecture. 
Modelling one agent coalition for each VPP requires not only 
modelling the agents that take part in each coalition, but also their 
interactions. These include interactions during distinct periods. In 
the pre-bidding period each VPP has to prepare the bids; after the 
clearance of the market, each VPP has to internally dispatch the 
sold energy. 
As the overall performance of the market simulator must be 
optimized, these VPP internal interactions should only overload the 
whole simulation in the exact required   measure. 
Moreover, in order to make VPP coalitions act at their best 
performance the first step was to determine how to integrate them 
in the market negotiations with minimum degradation of the 
previous implementation performance. 
This led to face each VPP as an individual multi-agent system, 
operating in the scope of the overall multi-agent system that 
simulates the electricity market. Considering each VPP as a multi- 
agent system allows an interesting approach from both the 
performance and the conceptual point of view. In order to develop 
a computational implementation of this conceptual architecture, 
each VPP has to have its own facilitator, with no relation to the 
market facilitator, to coordinate the negotiations between the 
members of each individual VPP. This means that each VPP has its 
own facilitator that allows it to communicate with all the producers 
that are part of its coalition or intend to join it, independently from 
the remaining agents’ communication. 
 
3.2. Coalition management/classification mechanism 
 
In order to asset the VPP with the capability to choose the most 
appropriate ways to manage its coalition, a classification structure 
that enables the VPP to choose the producers that are most 
adequate for the VPP’s strategy and goals at each moment has been 
created.  The  VPP  starts  by  defining  its   profile,  including      its 
  
 
 
Fig. 2. MASCEM agent architecture with VPPs. 
 
 
characteristics, and then, when a producer requests to join the 
coalition, it will be classified through a set of formulae that relate 
the producers’ and the VPP’s characteristics. At each negotiation 
period the VPP will choose the best candidates to join the coalition. 
The producers’ selection criteria are different for each VPP, 
depending on the dimension and on the already aggregated 
producers.  In  MASCEM,  VPPs  are   classified   according  to   the 
following five different pre-established types: 
 
• PVPP (Parallel VPP) e Includes different producers with 
distinct generation capacities, typically larger than 1 MW and 
lower than 20 MW. The common characteristic of the VPPs of 
this type is their participation in parallel markets; 
• LSVPP (Large Scale VPP) e Includes producers with large 
generation capacity, typically higher than 10 MW and many 
producers with small capacity, typically lower than 2 MW; 
• mVPP (Micro VPP) e This VPP type aggregates producers with 
very small capacity, typically lower than 1   MW; 
• GVPP (Global VPP) e This type of VPP aggregates both 
producers and consumers, assuming the function of a trader; 
• SVPP (Several VPP) e This VPP type does not have a priori 
defined characteristics so that it allows users to create more 
specific VPPs. 
 
Decision making for VPP formation and subsequent aggregation 
of more producers takes into account a large set of producers’ 
characteristics, such as the ones listed in the first column of Table 1. 
The weight of each of these characteristics depends on the VPP 
type, as shown in the subsequent columns of Table 1. These weights 
are based on economic criteria and on VPP market strategies, and 
reflect the importance that each characteristic has to the VPP. So, as 
higher the value of the weight for a certain characteristic gets, the 
more suitable the candidate to join the VPP is required to be in what 
concerns that characteristic. The characteristics  importance 
weights range from 0 to 10. The values presented in Table 1 have 
been   determined   based   on   a   set   of   a   priori   analyzed cases, 
 
considering possible VPP strategies and are used by MASCEM as 
default values. However MASCEM users can modify these values to 
adjust the VPP strategy according to their own needs. 
The user also has the possibility of developing and simulating 
scenarios in which VPPs change their aggregated producers, in 
order to improve VPP strategy in function of market   evolution. 
The classification structure has been integrated with MASCEM 
with the purpose of being tested in an actual market simulator, and 
so allowing to derive conclusions about the efficiency of this 
procedure, and about the development of the behaviour of the VPPs 
when including such mechanisms. This new feature is a real added 
value to the intelligence of the VPP agents, by increasing their 
ability to take the best decisions when confronted with particular 
situations (in this case, the election of the producers who would be 
a greater asset to the coalition in the present and future, and 
contribute the  most  to the achievement of  its objectives). 
The mechanism has been implemented in LPA-Prolog and its 
integration in MASCEM has been done in the private facilitator of 
each VPP. The features of this new mechanism   include: 
 
 
Table 1 
Producers’ characteristics  weights. 
Characteristics PVPP LSVPP mVPP GVPP SVPP 
Speculative energy cost 10 10 9 9 10 
Dispatchability 7 9 7 10 7 
Reliability 7 8 2 8 7 
Use of installed power 5 7 2 5 5 
Lifespan 3 3 1 3 5 
Volatility of prices 7 8 3 7 7 
2nd Market 9 4 4 6 5 
GHG emissions 7 6 5 5 5 
Location 4 2 8 6 5 
Dimension 4 3 8 5 5 
Technology type 5 5 6 6 5 
Social Impact 5 5 5 4 5 
Maturity of technology 4 5 2 4 5 
Commercial behaviour 5 6 3 5 5 
 
  
Table 2 
VPP’s characteristics and tolerance factors. 
 
 Characteristics    VPP 1  VPP 2  VPP 3  
 Type   Large  Global  Micro  
 Local   Barcelona  Madrid  Irun  
Objectives E.G. 
A.F. 
I.P.U. 
Expected Cost (V/MWh) 
Average Failure (MWh) 
Installed Power Use (hours) 
 0.045 
110* 
8000 
 0.039 
110* 
7500 
 0.043 
110* 
8500 
 
 Reli. Reliability (%)  97  90  85  
 L.C. Life Cycle (years)  10  15  20  
 Vol at. Volatility (V/MWh)  0.003  0.1  0.1  
 Emis. Emissions (g/MWh)  0.3  0.1  0.1  
 Dim. 
P.M.B.V. 
E.M.B.V. 
P.M.R. 
A.C.E. 
Dimension (MW) 
Parallel Market Business Value (V) 
Electric Market Business Value (V) 
Parallel Market Remuneration (V/MWh) 
Average Cost of Electricity (V/MWh) 
 20000 
5000* 
95000* 
0.009* 
0.05* 
 5000 
5000* 
95000* 
0.009* 
0.05* 
 200 
5000* 
95000* 
0.009* 
0.05* 
 
Tolerance E.C. Expected cost  20  10  10  
Factors (0e20) A.F. Average Failure  10  10  10  
 I.P.U. Installed Power Use  5  10  15  
 Reli. Reliability  5  10  15  
 L.C. Life Cycle  5  10  15  
 Vol at. Volatility  5  10  10  
 Emis. Emissions  10  10  10  
 Dim. 
T.Tec 
S.Imp. 
Tec.M. 
Local. 
C.B. 
S. M. 
Dimension 
Type of Technology 
Social Impact 
Technology Maturity 
Localization 
Commercial Behaviour 
Second Market 
 10 
0** 
0** 
0** 
20 
0** 
10 
 10 
0** 
0** 
0** 
20 
0** 
10 
 10 
0** 
0** 
0** 
20 
0** 
10 
 
Investments (0e1) Dim. Dimension  1  1  1  
  T. Tec. Type of Technology  0  0  1  
  Tec.M. Technology Maturity  1  1  0  
  Local. Localization  1  0  0  
* Non Real Value; ** Not Used Values. 
 
 
• The registration of new VPP types e There are five standard 
VPP a priori defined types. These VPP types present static factor 
weights, for an easier choice when a new VPP is created. 
Additionally, at the time of creation of a new VPP, the user has 
the choice of defining a new VPP type, defining the desired 
weights for the factors presented before. This allows the new 
VPP to be adapted to the specific objectives considered in each 
simulation; 
• The classification of producers that intend to join the aggre- 
gation e A new producer that desires to be aggregated  with 
a particular VPP must at a first instance provide all the data 
necessary for its classification concerning the VPP’s character- 
istics, and constituents. Each producer that sends its request for 
entering the VPP is awarded a classification; 
 
• The acceptance or refusal of a producer application e 
Depending on the strategy adopted by each VPP, the applicant 
producers will be accepted or refused in the coalition. The 
acceptance process is based on a priori defined limit for the 
minimum classification for which the coalition will allow the 
new producer to be aggregated. Moreover, the VPP can also 
define a maximum number of members to be part of the coa- 
lition, refusing the entrance of all that apply when that number 
is reached. 
 
When a new VPP is created in the simulator, it is required to 
define the various aspects that will characterize its objectives and 
desired orientation in the market. These factors and preferences 
will be the basis for the classification of each producer that  intends 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Producers’ data.       
Producers    Historical Values 
Name Local Technology  E. C. A. F. I. P.U. Reli. L. C. Volat. Emis. Dim. P.M.B.V. E.M.B.V. P.M.R..  
Producer 1 Barcelona SOLAR  0.06 120* 1839.6 98 24 0 0 4.2 5110* 100000* 0.0089*  
Producer 2 Barcelona SOLAR  0.055 120* 1664.4 99 23 0 0 41.8 5110* 100000* 0.0089*  
Producer 3 Ourense WIND  0.03 120* 3328.8 96 14 0 0 40000 5110* 100000* 0.0089*  
Producer 4 Cadiz WIND  0.034 120* 2890.8 92 19 0 0 39000 5110* 100000* 0.0089*  
Producer 5 Cordoba BIOMASS  0.04 120* 8146.8 86 17 0.005 0 6619 5110* 100000* 0.0089*  
Producer 6 Vizcaya WOOD  0.039 120* 8497.2 90 16 0 0 3871 5110* 100000* 0.0089*  
Producer 7 Tarragona ALMOND  0.032 120* 7971.6 87 7 0 0 500 5110* 100000* 0.0089*  
Producer 8 Malaga ORUJILLO  0.036 120* 7884 84 16 0 0 9150 5110* 100000* 0.0089*  
Producer 9 Lerida ANIMALS  0.025 120* 7884 91 21 0 -0,2 6000 5110* 100000* 0.0089*  
Producer 10 Cordoba OLIVE  0.037 120* 8322 78 17 0 0 300 5110* 100000* 0.0089*  
Producer 11 Ciudad Real USED  0.045 120* 7708.8 88 23 0 0.457 10000 5110* 100000* 0.0089*  
  
Table 4 
Producers’ classifications. 
 
 
 
 
 
to join this aggregation, together with the producer’s individual 
characteristics. These characteristics are also required when a new 
producer is created. 
Once a producer makes its application to join a certain VPP, all 
the information is sent to that VPP’s facilitator, which will be 
responsible for its classification, and for the acceptance/refusal of 
the application. If it is accepted, that producer will be a member of 
the coalition from that point  on. 
Throughout each day the revenues from all the periods of nego- 
tiation must be distributed amongst the members of the aggregation. 
 
To manage those transactions, the facilitator is also equipped  with 
a profit distribution mechanism, which determines the amounts of 
payoff that the VPP members are going to receive. 
This algorithm is based on the total amount of energy that the 
VPP was able to sell in each period; the market price for that period; 
and the amount of energy that each producer provided individually, 
along with the classification awarded by the VPP at the time of its 
entrance in the aggregation. The use of this mechanism ensures 
that the payoffs adequately reward the producers that are better 
classified, and those that produced the most in each period. 
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Fig. 3.  Energy market transaction by buyer. 
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Fig. 4.  Energy market transaction by seller. 
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The classification mechanism and the payoff distribution algo- 
rithm tests will be presented and discussed in the next section, 
using the VPP integration in MASCEM and the adjustment of the 
VPP facilitator to include the gathering and analysis of producers 
and the VPPs data. 
 
4. Case study 
 
The case study presented in this paper considers 11 seller 
agents, based on real producers of OMEL [24] (Spanish electricity 
market) with several technologies, together with 3 VPPs with 
distinct characteristics and strategies. 
The main goal is that each VPP chooses the best producers to 
aggregate, according to its initial objectives. After this process is 
concluded, the agents will start the negotiation in the market, using 
distinct strategies, which allow studying their performance and 
taking some conclusions on those strategies which are better to be 
used by the agents in the future. 
The results of VPP remuneration after each period of the market 
negotiations  will  also  be  presented  to  show  how  the   profits 
distribution mechanism works, considering the members classifi- 
cation along with their individual production as the main factors to 
the determination of the individual revenues. 
 
4.1. Classification 
 
Table 2 characterizes the three VPPs considered in the case 
study, showing their objectives and tolerance factors. These factors, 
combined with the characteristics of each individual candidate 
producer, determine whether that producer will or not be accepted 
by the VPP. 
Along with the factors presented in Table 2, the producers’ data 
must be gathered in order to allow the classification to take place. 
Table 3 presents the data respective to each producer considered 
for this simulation. The abbreviations used in this table are pre- 
sented in Table 2. 
The Technology refers to the production type of each producer, 
while the Local is the localization of the production plant. Regarding 
the historical values, they are presented in the units referred in 
Table 2, taken from the historical information provided by OMEL. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  VPP1 results. 
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Fig. 6.  VPP2 results. 
 
 
Using the proposed method for the classification, with  the 
inputs being the historical values from the various producers, 
combined with the VPPs data shown before, originates the indi- 
vidual classification for each of the producers for each VPP, and 
consequent proposal results (entrance in the coalition accepted or 
not accepted). Table 4 shows the classification assigned to the 
producers that proposed to enter each aggregation. The abbrevia- 
tions used in this table are presented in Table  2. 
It can be seen in Table 4 that all the producers would have the 
entrance in the various aggregations guaranteed because the VPPs 
are initially empty and have positively classified all of them 
(although the profit a producer can provide is small, it is always 
higher than the null profit the VPP gets while being empty). As 
there are some producers that proposed entrance to more than one 
VPP, they will have to pass through a negotiation stage, to deter- 
mine which producers will be assigned to each   VPP. 
 
4.1.1. Entrance negotiation 
Once the classification process is finished, it is time to determine 
which of the producers will enter which of the VPPs. As all the 
 
producers obtained positive classifications for entrance in the three 
VPPs, the ones with the higher values for each of the three aggre- 
gations were selected, starting from VPP1, then VPP2 and finally 
VPP3, as this was the order of appliance by the   producers. 
In Table 4 it can be seen that VPP1 was awarded four members, 
as this VPP imposed the restriction of accepting at most four 
candidates. The ones assigned are those that obtained the higher 
scores of classification of all that proposed for entrance in this VPP. 
Those four producers are: Producer 1, Producer 2, Producer 3 and 
Producer 4, being Producer 5, for that reason, excluded. Afterwards, 
VPP2 aggregated Producer 6, Producer 7 and Producer 8, because 
the other two applicants were already assigned to the first VPP. 
Finally, VPP3 included Producers 9, 10 and 11; the ones that applied 
to this VPP and that were not yet assigned to  other. 
This version of the negotiation mechanism takes only into 
consideration the perspective of the VPP, by order of appliance. This 
mechanism is currently being improved to consider negotiation by 
both parts: VPPs and producers, allowing them to negotiate with 
several entities, and decide, based on the classifications and 
entrance conditions, the best deals from both    perspectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Seller 2 results. 
  
 
 
Fig. 8. Seller 3 results. 
 
4.2. Market negotiation 
 
With the classification and aggregation processes completed, 
and so the VPPs aggregated players defined, the agents are ready for 
entrance in the market. We present a simulation referring to 
Wednesday, 29th October, 2008. The data used in this case study 
has been based on real data from the Spanish market, extracted 
from OMEL [24]. 
This simulation involves 7 buyers and 5 sellers (3 “normal” 
sellers and 2 of the VPPs considered before e VPP1 and VPP2). This 
group of agents was used with the intention of representing the 
Spanish reality, reduced to a smaller summarized group, containing 
the essential aspects of different parts of the market, in order to 
allow a better individual analysis and study the interactions and 
potentiality of each of those   actors. 
Agents’ bids are defined as  follows: 
 
I. Buyer 1 e This buyer buys energy independently of the 
market price. The offer price is 18.30 cV/kWh (this value is 
much higher than average market price) 
II. Buyer 2 e This buyer bid price varies between two fix prices, 
depending on the periods where it really needs to buy, and 
the ones in which the need is lower. The two prices are 10.00 
and 8.00 cV/kWh 
III. Buyer 3 e This buyer bid considers the average prices of the 
previous 4 months with an increment of 0.5 cV/kWh 
IV. Buyer 4 e This buyer bid considers the average prices of the 
previous 4 Wednesdays 
V. Buyer 5 e This buyer bid considers the average prices of the 
previous 4 months 
VI. Buyer 6 e This buyer bid considers the previous week average 
prices, considering only business days 
VII. Buyer 7 e This buyer only buys energy if market prices are 
low (this agent’s bid value is lower than average market 
 
VIII. Seller 1 e As this seller needs to sell all the energy that he 
produces, the offer price is 0.00 cV/kWh 
IX. Seller 2 e This seller bidding price is based on the results of 
a neural network with an input layer of eight units, regarding 
the price and traded power for the same period of the 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.  Producer 7 and Producer 8 produced energy and   remuneration. 
  
previous day, and the same weekdays of the previous three 
weeks. The neural network has an intermediate hidden layer 
of four units, and an output of one unit e the  predicted 
market price for the period in   question 
X. Seller 3 eBidding price based on linear regression over the 
historic OMEL data considering the price of all previous 
business days of October 
XI. VPP 1 e This VPP offers a fix value along the day. The offer 
price is a low value, because of the VPP’s need to sell, and 
guarantee the satisfaction of its aggregates. The offer value is 
3.50 cV/kWh 
XII. VPP 2 e VPP 2 offer price is based on generation costs of co- 
generation and on the total forecasted production. 
 
The average prices have been computed based on July, August, 
September and October OMEL market prices. 
Figs. 3 and 4 present Buyers’ and Sellers’ transactions for this 
case study. 
Analyzing the considered VPPs’ performance, we can see in 
Figs. 5 and 6 that both were able to sell all their available energy 
during the day. 
Regarding the market price definition, Seller 2 is the agent with 
the higher influence, followed by Seller 3, as presented in Figs. 7 
and 8. 
Seller 20 s offer price curve is very close the market price in all of 
the periods, following the market price tendency during all  day. 
This shows the neural network’s adequability in predicting the 
prices, and catching its  tendencies. 
Concerning Seller 3, using the linear regression, its bid prices are 
also very close to the market price along the day, although with 
a little more variation comparing to Seller 20 s bid curve. 
These results indicate that both these strategies, with some 
adjustments to scale the prices a bit lower, could probably be very 
successful to define adequate strategies for bid definition with the 
propose of achieving the higher possible market prices, for a greater 
revenue, while guaranteeing the selling of all the available  energy. 
 
4.2.1.  Profit division 
Throughout the simulation, the VPP must divide its profits 
among its members, having the classification along with the 
amounts of energy sold as main factors to consider. Fig. 9 shows the 
amount of produced energy and the distribution of the profits 
among two of the members of VPP 2 (producers 7 and 8). 
Analyzing Fig. 9, we may conclude that, despite having sold the 
same amounts of energy, Producer 8 presents a higher profit than 
Producer 7. That happens due to the much higher classification 
awarded to it. This proves the adequacy of the need of having the 
profits division based on the   classification. 
 
5. Conclusions and future work 
 
This paper presented MASCEM, an electricity market simulator 
able to model market players and simulate their operation in the 
market. As market players are complex entities, each one with their 
own characteristics and needs, which must take their own deci- 
sions interacting with other players, a multi-agent architecture is 
used and proved to be adequate. This architecture includes learning 
capabilities, so that players are able to redefine their strategies 
according to their past experience (both real and simulated), 
considering also other agents’  behaviour. 
The main focus of this paper is the VPP formation, i.e. producers’ 
aggregation, taking advantage on the proposed classification 
mechanism, and also on the study and implementation of some 
strategies to be used in the market by the intelligent agents. This 
allows the simulation of VPP operation, from production and load 
forecasting to real-time operation, after market clearance, while 
providing resources for the set of tasks VPP have to deal with, 
including reserve management, strategic bidding and producers’ 
remuneration. 
Concerning the proposed mechanisms, namely for classification 
and coalition entrance and management, they have proven to 
provide the VPP with a feature that allows it to better adequate its 
actions to the evolving status of the world, by recognizing the value 
that its actions can guarantee in the future. This proves to be a great 
improvement in the VPPs’ operation, and so, it has positive impact 
in all the simulation entities, as it provides the means for the 
simulation  to  be  more  and   more   close   to   reality, providing 
the scenarios we need to further study and adapt the players to the 
electricity market constantly changing reality. 
Relative to the players’ strategies in negotiating in the market, 
we can conclude that, from the performed studies, there are 
strategies that allow the achievement of very good results, being 
able to catch the trends of the market prices. This suggests that 
a combination of several considered strategies, considering the 
distinct characteristics of each period, and the entities involved at 
each time can bring strategy formulation for bid prices to a whole 
new level. This is one of the issues we find essential as future work 
to improve this simulator in terms of intelligent   behaviour. 
Another important issue is improving the negotiations inside 
coalitions, to allow such negotiations to be fairer for all parts, and to 
consider different perspectives, i.e. the case of the negotiations 
between VPPs and candidates to justify an entrance to the coalition, 
or the candidate’s choice of a coalition instead of another. To ach- 
ieve that, we intend to take advantage of sophisticated protocols, 
where other Artificial Intelligence techniques, such as argumenta- 
tion and multiple criteria based negotiations may be combined. 
Inside the context of multi-agent negotiation, an argument is seen 
as a piece of information able to influence other agents’ negotiation 
stance and/or justify their own agent negotiation stance [25,26,27]. 
Argumentation can be excellent to justify possible choices and to 
convince other elements of the coalition that one alternative is 
better or worse than  another. 
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